Ella and the President's Mandate

Ella causes abortion. This link tells how.

Ella is covered under the new HHS mandate for insurance as a so-called emergency contraceptive.  So Catholic dioceses and agencies will have have to pay for plans that include this coverage.  Ella is a progesterone modulator that is called ulipristal acetate.  It could be described as a weaker formula of the drug mifepristone popularly known as the abortion drug, RU-486.

Of course, the promoters of the drug argue it stops ovulation while acknowledging that it is a selective progesterone receptor modulator.  The problem with that argument is that the science behind the drug completely contradicts their claim.  Their claims are purely political, not scientific.  If the drug blocks progesterone production, it can act to prevent implantation of an embryo.

Menstrual cycle

The chart to the right, which one can find almost anywhere, clearly shows that progesterone levels certainly do not rise much prior to ovulation, but after ovulation there is a notable increase. The chart also shows how the endometrial lining which can support the embryo develops under the influence of progesterone after ovulation has occurred.

Apparently, Ella makers and the FDA claim that blocking progesterone production in turn blocks ovulation and nothing more. That is absurd as any scientific chart similar to the one shown here will demonstrate. In the body, following upon ovulation, progesterone is produced by the corpus luteum, which is what remains of the ovarian follicle after ovulation occurs. To suggest that a progesterone blocker such as Ella only prevents ovulation is nothing short of a deliberate falsehood and a political hoax of the worst kind.

Progesterone acts to prepare the endometrium, the lining of the uterus, to sustain the developing embryo that is formed at conception.  No progesterone, no continuation of pregnancy.  In other words, if a woman is ovulating around the time of taking Ella, after intercourse, the consequence of ingesting the drug will be the ejection of the young embryo from the womb of the mother.  This is quite clearly an abortion.
On the basis of experience with RU-486, those who testified before the FDA against approval of the drug warned of the serious adverse effects for women who would use the Ella drug.  RU-486 was linked directly to deaths and numerous hospitalizations.  Much like the science behind the drug itself, this testimony was completely ignored.

It should be clear to all concerned what is at stake here for the Church.  The Church cannot follow the mandate because the Church herself would be implicated in the direct killing of innocent human life which she condemns with the most severe of remedial penalties. According to the universal law of the Church, the penalty for deliberately aborting is automatic excommunication.  Abortion includes the ejection or destruction of the embryo between conception and implantation.  Ella does exactly that.  Ella is also potentially dangerous to women.  The use of the drug can only be rejected.

Senator Mary Landrieu Votes Against Protection of Conscience Rights

13 Catholic Senators Vote Against Protection of Church's Right to Follow Its Own Teaching

In a story from the Times Picayune, by Jonathon Tilove, Landrieu said,

The Blunt amendment simply goes too far,.... It would allow any insurance provider to block any service, preventive or otherwise, that is "contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of the sponsor, issuer or other entity offering the plan." This not only includes preventive birth control medication, which millions of American women rely on, but could also include blood transfusions, organ transplants or hospice care, which some 'sponsors' may find objectionable.

Oh, and Obamacare and the HHS Mandate doesn't go too far? I wonder why she did not do this kind of parsing of the Obamacare bill when she voted for that!

Landrieu thinks the President Obama's "accommodation" is just dandy.

The administration has now modified the policy, and the revised rule, in my view, protects religious freedom and respects the rights of churches and Catholic hospitals and institutions.

Yes, you and about 12 other Catholics in the US Senate.  Since you have publicly stated your support for all of this Senator Landrieu, as a priest from your state, I would like to ask you to publicly repent of the scandal that you are causing.  You need to repent and confess your sins.

Freedom of Religion without Exemption--Tax Exemption, That Is?

Since my last post on the Obamacare mandate I have had many thoughts about the matter, mostly born of frustration. It seems likely to me that the notion of religious liberty will prevail in the end.  However, the persons in control of the executive and legislative branches of the government will not back down from the mandate or revise the regulations in a way that restores respect for the freedom of religious groups in this country.  The solution could be a legal one fought in court.  To me, that means that there is going to be a great deal of constitutional hair-splitting.  I wonder if the meaning of religious liberty that comes out the other end of this fight will look exactly like the one we have come to rely upon.

Church leaders are probably thinking more right now about the freedom to live the faith in the public arena and the best way to continue to operate their programs.  The question on the minds of many Church leaders has to be, "What will I do if my ______________ is forced to provide this coverage?"  Fill in the blank with diocese, hospital, school, university, etc.  Some will pay the penalty or go to jail if it comes to that.  I know that many bishops and religious superiors are willing to fight for the identity of these institutions.  I have to ask, though, if the fight is really going to end on the issue of whether the offensive practices are covered under insurance plans.

On the judicial side, the sense of drama will peak when the concern for keeping the Church's institutions identity intact comes up against the tax exempt status enjoyed by the Church.  Is this issue the crux of the underlying plan of the administration? Does the government want to force the Church, indeed all religious groups, to chose between tax exemption and public witness?  The government's coffers would be greatly enhanced by taxation of religious bodies.

I know that there are those who would consider me ignorant and even foolish for suggesting that tax exemption and religious liberty do not go hand in glove.  I would counter that the weight of authority is against that idea, though.  I know Chief Justice John Marshall's 1819 dictum, "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."  In days past that close connection could have been logically self-sustaining in any case, not only taxation of the federal government by the states involved in the McCulloch v. Maryland case.   However, the weight of the arguments might go the opposite direction and support taxing religious organizations.

The tax exemption granted to religious institutions is based, in part, on the fact that these institutions serve a secular purpose.  Will there be arguments now that the tax exemption will not be allowed if the requirements of the HHS mandate are not met by religious employers? In my estimation, the only way to stop this is to teach the demagogues a good lesson by a sound electoral trouncing, a position that tax-exempt organizations are not able to advocate.

The Evil of the Mandate

We are going to hear all sorts of attempts to accommodate the President's Mandate "accommodation" within Catholic ranks.  The chiefs of Catholic Charities and the Catholic Health Association were obviously given the advance notice they needed to be ready to give the President the shout out on this. There will be many more. They will all make their comments based upon convoluted, moralistic platitudes about the good of providing universal access to health care which, they say, trumps participation in moral evil.  These positions will be mortally flawed.  Will they be corrected?  I would hope so.

Willing cooperation in grave evil in order to secure a benefit for oneself makes the person who cooperates equally guilty of the grave evil.  What is the goal, exactly, of agreeing with the President on this?  Is it because those who go along with the President's mandate want people to have access to these so-called preventive services?  If so, the cooperation in the program of contraception, sterilization, and chemical abortions is immoral and gravely sinful.  Is it because they want to maintain government funding and the ability to "serve" the general public?  The cooperation is still gravely sinful.

In fact, it is quite clear that these agencies and their affiliated institutions cannot cooperate in this plan to provide abortion, sterilization, or contraceptives.  Indeed, this plan of the President's is morally evil, in itself.  It is what moral theology and Catholic doctrine refer to as "intrinsic evil."  Yes, that's right.  The plan itself, not just the acts of abortion, contraception and sterilization, is intrinsically evil.

Please see the following Doctrinal Statement issued by the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith on March 13, 1975.  It was called "Quecumque sterilizatio." Some will argue that this doctrinal statement does not apply because we are talking about health insurance plans and not the health care institution as the statement does.  I say, however, that this is a distinction without a difference.  As a matter of fact, on the basis of principles espoused in the document itself, one must conclude that providing the approval of a plan for such gravely immoral actions across a wide array of institutions and circumstances is itself a greater evil than a plan which consents to the evil in one single institution. 

I will post later on the abortion drug issue. 

For convenience sake, I have highlighted some of the more pertinent elements of the CDF's statement.  

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING STERILIZATION IN CATHOLIC HOSPITALS

This Sacred Congregation has diligently considered not only the problem of contraceptive sterilization for therapeutic purposes but also the opinions indicated by different people toward a solution, and the conflicts relative to requests for cooperation in such sterilizations in Catholic hospitals. The Congregation has resolved to respond to these questions in this way:  

1. Any sterilization which of itself, that is, of its own nature and condition, has the sole immediate effect of rendering the generative faculty incapable of procreation, is to be considered direct sterilization, as the term is understood in the declarations of the pontifical Magisterium, especially of Pius XII¹. Therefore, notwithstanding any subjectively right intention of those whose actions are prompted by the care or prevention of physical or mental illness which is foreseen or feared as a result of pregnancy, such sterilization remains absolutely forbidden according to the doctrine of the Church. And indeed the sterilization of the faculty itself is forbidden for an even graver reason than the sterilization of individual acts, since it induces a state of sterility in the person which is almost always irreversible.  

Neither can any mandate of public authority, which would seek to impose direct sterilization as necessary for the common good, be invoked, for such sterilization damages the dignity and inviolability of the human person². Likewise, neither can one invoke the principle of totality in this case, in virtue of which principal interference with organs is justified for the greater good of the person; sterility intended in itself is not oriented to the integral good of the person as rightly pursued “the proper order of goods being preserved”³ inasmuch as it damages the ethical good of the person, which is the highest good, since it deliberately deprives foreseen and freely chosen sexual activity of an essential element. Thus article 20 of the medical-ethics code promulgated by the conference in 1971 faithfully reflects the doctrine which is to be held, and its observance should be urged. 

2. The Congregation, while it confirms this traditional doctrine of the Church, is not unaware of the dissent against this teaching from many theologians. The Congregation, however, denies that doctrinal significance can be attributed to this fact as such, so as to constitute a “theological source” which the faithful might invoke and thereby abandon the authentic Magisterium, and follow the opinions of private theologians which dissent from it⁴. 

3. Insofar as the management of Catholic hospitals is concerned:  

a) Any cooperation which involves the approval or consent of the hospitals to actions which are in themselves, that is, by their nature and condition, directed to a contraceptive end, namely, in order that the natural effects of sexual actions deliberately performed by the sterilized subject be impeded, is absolutely forbidden. For the official approbation of direct sterilization and, a fortiori, its management and execution in accord with hospital regulations, is a matter which, in the objective order, is by its very nature (or intrinsically) evil. The Catholic hospital cannot cooperate with this for any reason. Any cooperation so supplied is totally unbecoming the mission entrusted to this type of institution and would be contrary to the necessary proclamation and defense of the moral order. 

b) The traditional doctrine regarding material cooperation, with the proper distinctions between necessary and free, proximate and remote, remains valid, to be applied with the utmost prudence, if the case warrants. 

c) In the application of the principle of material cooperation, if the case warrants, great care must be taken against scandal and the danger of any misunderstanding by an appropriate explanation of what is really being done. 

This Sacred Congregation hopes that the criteria recalled in this letter will satisfy the expectations of that episcopate, in order that, with the uncertainties of the faithful cleared up, the Bishops might more easily respond to their pastoral duty. 

Franjo Cardinal Šeper
Prefect 

Most Rev. Jérôme Hamer, O.P.  Titular Archbishop of Lorium 

Secretary 

l. Cf. especially the two Allocutions to the Catholic Union of Obstetricians and to the International Society of Hematology: AAS 43 (1951) 843-844; 50 (1958) 734-737 and in the encyclical of Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, 14: AAS 60 (1968) 490-491.
2. Cf. Pius XI, the encyclical Casti Connubii: AAS 22 (1930) 565.
3. Paul VI, the encyclical Humanae Vitae: AAS 60 (1968) 487.
4. Cf. Vatican Council II, constitution Lumen Gentium, n. 25, 1: AAS 57 (1965) 29-30; Pius XII, Allocution to the Most Reverend Cardinals: AAS 46 (1954) 672; the encyclical Humani Generis: AAS 42 (1950) 568; Paul VI, Allocution to the meeting regarding the theology of Vatican Council II: AAS 58 (1966) 889-896 (especially 890-894); Allocution to the Members of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer: AAS 59 (1967) 960-963 (especially 962).

 

Companies Supporting So-Called Same-Sex Marriage

Amazon, Starbucks, Nike...The List Goes On

"Amazon is joining other Pacific Northwest companies, including Microsoft, Starbucks and Nike, in support of Washington state's marriage equality bills," Amazon said in a statement released by spokeswoman Mary Osako. "The spirit of these bills is consistent with our longstanding employment practices."


Catholic Answers has a good resource on the issue of same-sex unions.


I will try to post soon on the morality of doing business with these companies. The assault on Christianity continues....

Pelosi, Sebelius, Kennedy, and other Errant Catholics

Speaker Pelosi , Governor Sebelius (soon to be Secretary Sebelius) and Representative Patrick Kennedy, among a whole host of politicians who claim to be Catholic, are getting a great deal of awful theological advice and, in their own way, have become errant theologians themselves. We have all heard Nancy Pelosi's foolish remarks about abortion. Recently, some correspondents have sent statements made by Gov. Sebelius and Rep. Kennedy.

Gov. Sebelius has said,

My Catholic faith teaches me that all life is sacred, and personally I believe abortion is wrong. However, I disagree with the suggestion that criminalizing women and their doctors is an effective means of achieving the goal of reducing the number of bortions in our nation.

There is another way. By working in support of the common good we can better protect human life and the dignity of all people.

If we work hard and match our rhetoric with our actions, we can create a culture that is more welcoming of mothers and treasuring of our children. We must redouble our efforts on prevention and personal responsibility. We must stand with women who feel so alone that abortion seems like their only choice. These women need people to walk with them, not cast stones at them....

If we truly wish to reduce the number of abortions further, we need to work together to truly promote a culture of life, by helping women and families get the support they need when facing unexpected pregnancies and to continue to reduce the number of abortions. Health care, child care, job opportunities, affordable housing—they are all the building blocks of a culture of life and we can use them to build a future where abortion is extremely rare.

In response to a constituent who wrote to ask him to vote against the Freedom of Choice Act, Patrick Kennedy wrote:

As you may know, the Freedom of Choice Act would codify into law the Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade, which ensures a woman's right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. In addition, this legislation also attempts to preserve a women's right to choose by preventing any legislation that would interfere or cause undue burden. I support the primary purpose of the Freedom of Choice Act, which is to ensure a woman's right to choose by making it public law, so that the national dialogue in regards to women's reproductive health and abortion may take a more fruitful course than in the past.

Regardless of where each of us stands on the issue of abortion, we can both agree that no one wants a woman to be faced with the choice to terminate her pregnancy. As former President Clinton has said, 'abortion should be safe, legal, and rare.' Therefore, I believe the dialogue of this nation should be centered on how to prevent unintended pregnancies, so that the need for abortion is greatly reduced. One important step we can take in addressing this issue is by ensuring comprehensive sex education, which instills in youth and young adults the merits of abstinence and safe-sex.

These Catholic politicians, like so many others, have all been mislead into believing that one can support laws which uphold the so-called right to abortion as long as one is personally opposed to abortion or wishes to reduce the number of abortions somehow through some unspecified social policies. The theologians behind this coaching are no doubt, themselves, badly mistaken about the meaning of freedom and the nature of law. One wonders if these theologians are the same ones that were on the list of President Obama's Catholic Advisory Council.

The statements made by these politicians demonstrate an absurd notion of human freedom, one that is completely inconsistent with human nature. Consider carefully what they are saying. A person has a right to abortion because it is a free choice. A woman has a right to kill her unborn child because of freedom. But, would reason not dictate, rather, that killing innocent human beings is not consistent with human freedom? Indeed, since we are speaking of freedom which properly belongs to human beings, would it not be more correct to say that the proper exercise of human freedom excludes the killing other innocent human beings? The mental deformity that allows one to believe that freedom includes the right to kill the innocent is so completely depraved that it should be called uncivilized and barbaric.

The codification of this notion of freedom in a national law permitting abortion is the creation of the worst kind of injustice in codified law. Since such a law sanctions the attack upon innocent human life, it makes law, which is supposedly for the common good, an enemy of the fundamental good of human life. There is no reasonable proposition that would justify the sanctioning of the destruction of the good of the life of one in the name of the good of freedom of another. How could one human's authentic good, in this case freedom, possibly be the cause for permitting the annihilation of another person's right to live? If such a law cannot be considered unjust and, indeed, barbaric, by all reasonable people because it contradicts the good of human life, on what basis would any law against human killing be based? There are only two elements in the equation--freedom of choice and defenseless human life. Is it that none of the theologians giving this bad advise to these politicians see the unreasonableness? If all they are asserting in the end is some political notion of freedom and rights, then, are we not saying that any form of human oppression can be justified in the name of freedom?

These theologians and politicians have contributed to the continuing downhill slide into an anarchical tyrrany of relativism.

Resuming Posts

I have been away for a while due to holidays and number or other pressing commitments at the seminary, but I am going to be returning to the blog. I noted recently Diocese of Scranton has posted Bishop Martino's instruction regarding the duty of the minister of Holy Communion. This is an edifying and proper (i.e., particular) application of the universal moral law. Given the treatment afforded the subject in other posts on this blog, this sentence was of particular note: "Those whose unworthiness to receive Holy Communion is known publicly to the Church must be refused Holy Communion in order to prevent sacrilege and to prevent the Catholic in question from committing further grave sin through unworthy reception." (attributed to Bishop Martino by the Chancellor, James B. Earley) It is difficult to understand why anyone having pastoral responsibility over the administration of the sacraments would disagree with this statement and not seek zealously to guard against the evils that the statement envisions. As I have stated before, as far as I can tell, no one has been able to articulate a moral or legal defense for allowing notoriously grave sinners to receive Holy Communion.

The Sin of the Politician or Public Official that Votes for Or Upholds the Validity of Permissive Abortion Laws

The last two installments of this series of post indicated that formal cooperation in abortion was a reason why pro-abortion politicians must be judged unworthy to receive Holy Communion and must, therefore, be denied the Sacrament by the minister. When Benedict XVI was prefect of the CDF he indicated that formal cooperation in abortion was a reason why the politician was unworthy. Indeed, that cooperation in the results of such immoral laws are the cause for serious concern among the Church’s ministers. In Evangelium vitae, no. 73, John Paul II raised the issue of these laws saying, “In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to ‘take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or vote for it.’” This quotation is from the Declaration on Procured Abortion, no. 22. Cardinal Ratzinger’s 2004 letter referred directly to this idea insofar as it spoke of campaigning and voting for the immoral law. Here is the relevant statement from the Declaration on Procured Abortion: “It must in any case be clearly understood that whatever may be laid down by civil law in this matter, man can never obey a law which is in itself immoral, and such is the case of a law which would admit in principle the liceity of abortion. Nor can he take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or vote for it. Moreover, he may not collaborate in its application.”

The interesting point about these texts from Evangelium vitae and the Declaration on Procured Abortion is that the issue is not so much the cooperation in one or more procured abortions, but the cooperation in the creation of intrinsically immoral laws. In the next post, the blog will take a closer look at this issue.

Works cited:

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured Abortion (18 November 1974), No. 22: AAS 66 (1974), 744.)

Campaigning and Voting for Permissive Abortion Laws Place the Politician in an Objective Situation of Grave Sin, i.e., Manifest Grave Sin

It is clear from the last post that the traditional moral teaching, presented in the earlier posts, prevails regarding the role of the minister in the administration of Holy Communion according to the 2004 letter of the Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger. In fact, the future pope’s statement is utterly congruent with and reaffirms traditional moral principles on the administration of Holy Communion and the minister’s responsibility. The statement includes the pastoral element of meeting with the offender and instructing him or her on the recipient’s duty not to approach reception of the sacrament until the objective situation of sin is remedied. The instruction given by Cardinal Ratzinger precisely outlines the steps which must be taken if when the politician is in an objective situation of grave sin. This is an instruction to the ministers of the sacrament and it is precisely the kind of action which must be taken if the minister, himself, is to avoid the sins of immoral cooperation and scandal. The conclusion that one must make, following upon the statement is unmistakable: In keeping with the minister’s moral duties regarding the administration of the sacraments, he must deny the Holy Eucharist to those who do not remedy the public situation of sin created by campaigning and voting for permissive abortion laws.

When Cardinal Ratzinger wrote that letter, he characterized the sin of the Catholic politician who campaigns and votes for abortion as formal cooperation in the grave sin of abortion. In this case, the cooperation of the politician in abortion is the issue. This is an important point. A formal cooperator is one who agrees with the immoral act, either in the intention (the motive for having an abortion) or the object (the abortion as a means to an end) or both, of the person or persons who are the principal agents of the grave sin of abortion. According to the principles of cooperation, the formal cooperator is equally guilty of the sin as the principal agent because the cooperator adopts the evil outcome of the principal agent’s actions as his or her own. Thus, the politician who formally cooperates by consistently campaigning and voting for permissive abortion laws is guilty of all the instances of the sin of abortion that he or she seeks to permit through the campaigning and voting for the permissive laws. The critical factor for the minister of Holy Communion is that these sins are "manifest" by virtue of the public nature of the activity in the political life of the state. The minister has the right and the responsibility to take cognizance of this manifest state of sin.

Cooperation and Scandal: Are Politicians Who Vote for Permissive Abortion Laws Manifest Grave Sinners and Unworthy to Receive Holy Communion?

In the discussions that surround the issue of Holy Communion and the public sinner who is, therefore, unworthy to receive the sacrament, no one, as far as this author is able to tell, has given an explanation as to why the traditional moral teaching in this matter does not prevail in the matter of politicians who support a so-called right to abortion. Concerning the canonical discipline, the Rev. John P. Beal argued in 2004 that c. 915 could not be used to exclude pro-abortion politicians from Holy Communion, asserting that politicians cannot be compared to prostitutes, magicians and others who are publicly unworthy. (Beal, 2004) Unfortunately, the author does not give an explanation of his opinion that could withstand serious scrutiny. Distinguishing the pro-abortion politicians from those who are divorced and remarried, in the same article he argues, “However loathsome some politicians’ views and votes on life issues may be, it is hard to see how it can be said that theirs is a state and condition of life in such objective contradiction to the Gospel that their grave sin should be judged ‘manifest.’” That claim, given the death of those innocents whom the politicians make no effort to protect, is illogical and untenable. His assertions are in no way consistent with the moral law of administration of the sacraments. In any case, as Archbishop Burke points out in his article in 2007, the moral issue was settled by Cardinal Ratzinger in a letter to the bishops of the United States. What the future pope said seems to remove any doubt about the politician’s responsibility for the grave sin of abortion: “Regarding the grave sin of abortion or euthanasia, when a person's formal cooperation becomes manifest (understood, in the case of a Catholic politician, as his consistently campaigning and voting for permissive abortion and euthanasia laws), his Pastor should meet with him, instructing him about the Church's teaching, informing him that he is not to present himself for Holy Communion until he brings to an end the objective situation of sin, and warning him that he will otherwise be denied the Eucharist.” (Ratzinger, 2004) That letter is widely available though it was a private letter sent to Archbishop Wilton Gregory and Cardinal Theodore McCarrick as representatives of the bishops' conference in the United States.


Works cited:

Beal, John P. 2004. Holy Communion and Unholy Politics. America, (June 21), http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=3635

Ratzinger, Joseph Cardinal. 2004. Worthiness to Receive Holy Communion. General Principles. L’espresso, (July 3), http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/7055?eng=y.

Cooperation and Scandal: The Differences between the Cases of the Public and "Private" Sinner

One could ask why we would need to consider cooperation in sacrilege when, morally speaking, the avoidance of scandal should be sufficient reason for the minister to refuse communion to a public sinner. The answer to that question lies in the fact that many ministers of the sacraments do not understand the seriousness of the matter. As a matter of fact, one must be dismayed by the general lack of awareness of sound moral principles regarding the administration of the sacraments. This is not to say that the Church’s ministers are intentionally failing in their responsibility, but the discussion that has taken place surrounding this matter of Holy Communion certainly points to a lack of knowledge about authentic moral principles which guide the administration of sacraments. Perhaps by considering the more basic question of the minister's moral culpability for cooperation in another’s sin, the importance of the issue of scandal involved in public sin can be better appreciated.

In their erudite treatment, Moral Theology: A Complete Course, Dominican authors John McHugh, OP, and Charles Callan, OP, discuss the circumstances under which the minister must deny the sacraments to a potential recipient. They write, the minister “must deny them, as a rule, to those who to his knowledge are certainly unworthy (e.g., on account of lack of requisite instruction or moral disposition); otherwise he casts pearls before swine, cooperates in the sacrilege of others, and scandalizes the people.” (Mc Hugh and Callan 1958, 2: 663) They add, “Hence a public sinner—that is, one whose unworthiness is notorious…--should not be given the Sacraments publicly, until he has repaired the scandal he gave; and no unworthy person, even though he is a hidden sinner whose guilt is known only to the minister, should be given a Sacrament in private until he has shown signs of repentance.” (663) They indicate quite clearly that the minister must refuse to admit to Holy Communion persons who are known to be unworthy. “Those persons are denied communion who cannot receive without scandal.” (687) Among those who cannot receive under this circumstance they identify those who are infamous such as prostitutes or defamers and those who are intoxicated or “insufficiently dressed.” (687)

The authors make some points here which need to be clearly understood. First, the worthiness of the recipient is, in fact, an issue when administering sacraments. Thus, it is incumbent upon the minister to be aware of the potential for immoral cooperation and scandal. Secondly, the question of cooperation in sacrilege arises in the case of any sinner, not only the case of the public sinner. Thirdly, the minister’s response to the unworthy recipient differs depending upon whether the recipient’s unworthiness results from a public sin or a hidden (not public) sin. When the grave sin is not public, administering the sacrament to the unworthy recipient whose sin is known to the minister constitutes cooperation in the sin. In such a case, however, cooperation is permissible under some circumstances and scandal is not likely to become an issue. But, when the sin is public, the matter of scandal takes on paramount importance. And, since the moral law called for “repair of the scandal” as a matter of justice, essentially a public repentance, the unworthy recipient could not receive the sacraments publicly again even if he had confessed the sin and received absolution. The authors, however, in no way discount the need for absolution for the one whose sin is private but known to the minister.

The fact that scandal becomes the overriding moral issue in the case of the public sinner does not, however, eliminate the need to consider the duty of the minister not to cooperate in sacrilege.

Works cited:

McHugh, John A., OP, and Callan, Charles J., OP, 1958. Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and Best Modern Authors. Rev. and en., Edward P. Farrell, OP. New York: Joseph F. Wagner.

(Fourth post in a series on Communion and Pro-Abortion Politicians)

Cooperation and Scandal: Can the Minister of Holy Communion Ignore the Worthiness of the Recipient without Risk of Sin?

In the writings of the moral authors as well as canonists the issues of scandal and cooperation were discussed and analyzed proximately because both principles treat of involvement of one person in another’s sin. The noted canonist and moralist, Dominic Prummer, OP, distinguishes the two, saying, “Co-operation differs from scandal is so far as the latter causes the evil will of the sinner (by advice, command, or example), whereas co-operation presupposes the evil will of the sinner and is a means of bringing this evil will to completion in an external act.” (Dominic M. Prummer, OP, Handbook of Moral Theology, trans., Gerald W. Shelton [Cork: Mercier, 1956] 103). There are good reasons why commentaries on canon law (and the Catechism of the Catholic Church, as well) should emphasize scandal, in general. Scandal is a bit of a trump card in the moral arena. An otherwise moral action can become immoral if it causes scandal, or, in other words, leads another into sin. Scandal can be a particular concern for those in authority since a person in authority has a responsibility to lead and instruct. This analysis will turn to the issue of scandal later but cooperation will be addressed first.

Given the statement from Prummer it is easy to see why moral theology needs to look at the morality of cooperation of the minister in the administration of sacraments. In charity, after love of God, the first responsibility of the minister is to the good of his own soul. Immoral cooperation follows on the evil will of the person with whom he cooperates. If the participation in the other person’s sin is immoral, then, the cooperator commits sin which can be grave. Moreover, to act prudently and with a certain conscience, which is morally required, the cooperator must consider the moral meaning of his act of cooperation. If the cooperator is unsure about the moral goodness of the action or simply dismisses the involvement in the other person’s sin as unimportant, he can still be responsible for the sin of immoral cooperation. This is so because no one is permitted to act with a doubtful conscience and all reasonable efforts should be exhausted to resolve doubts. Ignorance is not necessarily a justification for acting in an evil fashion, either. For as the Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 1791, teaches, “Ignorance can often be imputed to personal responsibility. This is the case when a man ‘takes little trouble to find out what is true and good, or when conscience is blinded through the habit of committing sin. [Gaudium et spes, 16] In such cases the person is culpable for the evil he commits.” This result flows out of the serious duty each of us has to avoid evil.

In the case of the minister of Holy Communion who allows a recipient to receive the sacrament even when that one is notoriously a serious sinner, according to moral principles, the morality of the minister’s cooperation in the sin of sacrilege must be analyzed. The minister's failure to consider this moral issue does not make, in the end, the minister’s action less subject to moral evaluation. This outcome ought be obvious to anyone who has even a basic knowledge of morality. In fact, failure to consider one’s potential cooperation in another’s sin may suggest a blindness to sin that the Catechism (1791) cautions against.

(Third post of series begun Nov. 13, 2008)